Secret-sharing is an important topic of cryptography and has applications in information security. One approach to the construction of secret-sharing schemes is based on error-correcting codes. In this paper, we describe a secret-sharing scheme based on a class of ternary codes (Ding et al. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory IT-46 (2000) 280 -284). We determine the access structure and prove properties of the secret-sharing scheme.
Introduction
In a secret-sharing scheme, a dealer has a secret. The dealer gives each party in the scheme a share of the secret. Let P denote the set of parties involved in the secret-sharing. There is a set ⊆ 2 P such that any subset of parties that is in can determine the secret and no subset in 2 P \ can determine the secret. The set is called the access structure of the secret-sharing scheme.
The ÿrst construction of secret-sharing schemes was done by Blakley [3] and Shamir [14] . Since then many other schemes have been proposed and studied. Two kinds of approaches to the construction of secret-sharing schemes based on linear codes have been so far considered (see [9-12, 1, 4, 15] ). The relations between secret-sharing and codes based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem are dealt with by Ding et al. in [6, Chapter 7] .
The access structure of secret-sharing schemes based on error-correcting codes depends on the weight distribution of their dual codes. In fact, the determination of the access structure of those secret-sharing schemes requires more than the knowledge of the weight distribution. This makes it rather di cult to determine the access structure of secret-sharing schemes based on codes, as determining the weight distribution of codes is a very hard problem in general. Note that the weight distribution of only a few classes of codes is known. In principle, every error-correcting linear code can be used to construct secret-sharing scheme. The question is how to determine the access structure.
In this paper, we describe a secret-sharing scheme based on a class of ternary codes which is described and analyzed by Ding et al. [5] . We determine the access structure of the secret-sharing schemes and prove their properties. The access structure of this secret-sharing scheme is richer, compared with the schemes based on some two weight geometric codes [1] . We are able to determine the access structure of our secret-sharing scheme because the structure of the underlying error-correcting ternary codes is fully understood [5] .
The general secret-sharing scheme based on codes
Recall that a code of length N over GF(q) is a nonempty subset of GF(q)
N . An [N; k; q] linear code is a k-dimensional subspace of GF(q) N . The elements of a code are called codewords. The (Hamming) weight of a codeword c, denoted wt(c), is the number of nonzero positions in c. The minimum distance d of the code is the smallest (Hamming) distance between any two distinct codewords. Because of linearity, this is also the smallest weight of a nonzero codeword. Sometimes we include d in the notation and describe the code as an [N; k; d; q] code. A generator matrix G of an [N; k; q] code C is a k × N matrix over GF(q) whose rows form a basis for C.
One approach to the construction of secret-sharing schemes based on linear codes is as follows. Choose an [N; k; q] code C such that its dual code C ⊥ has no codeword of Hamming weight one. Let G be a generator matrix of C. Let s ∈ GF(q) denote the secret, and g 0 = (g 00 ; g 10 ; : : : ; g k−1;0 )
T be the ÿrst column of the generator matrix G. Then the information vector u = (u 0 ; : : : ; u k−1 ) is chosen to be any vector of GF(q)
The codeword corresponding to this information vector u is t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t N −1 ) = uG:
We give t i to the party p i as their share for each i¿1, and the ÿrst component t 0 = s of the codeword t is the secret. So the number of parties involved in this secret-sharing scheme is N − 1.
It is not hard to prove that in the secret-sharing scheme based on a generator matrix G = [g 0 g 1 ; : : : ; g N −1 ] of an [N; k; q] linear code such that g 0 is a linear combination of the other N − 1 columns g 1 ; : : : ; g N −1 , the secret t 0 is determined by the set of shares {t i1 ; : : : ; t im } if and only if g 0 is a linear combination of the vectors g i1 ; : : : ; g im , where 16i 1 ¡ · · · ¡i m 6N − 1 and m6N − 1.
Computing the secret is straightforward: solve the linear equation
to ÿnd x j , and the secret is then given by
Secret-sharing schemes based on this general approach were considered by Karnin et al. [7] , and Massey [9, 10] . The approach of McEliece and Sarwate is di erent but closely related [11] . For secret-sharing schemes based on the Karnin-Green-Hellman approach, Massey introduced the concept of minimal codewords and characterized the resulting access structures [9, 10] . We state his characterization in the following lemma which will be needed in later sections. Here we would point out that this lemma was incorrectly stated in [1, 12] , but other results in the two references are still correct.
We also mention the fact that for secret-sharing schemes based on the above approach, a set of shares either determines the secret or gives no information about it, i.e., such schemes are perfect. This fact and Lemma 1 will be used to determine the access structure of our secret-sharing scheme later. The access structure of secret-sharing schemes based on error-correcting codes is closely related to the parameters of the codes. For details, we refer to [12] .
The class of ternary codes
Note that (GF (2) n ; +) is an additive Abelian group of exponent 2 and order N = 2 n , with 0 as the identity element. From now on we assume that n¿2. Let M denote the multiplicative group of characters from GF (2) n to GF(3) * . The group M is isomorphic non-canonically to GF (2) n [13, Chapter 6] . In particular we have |M | = |GF (2) n | = N = 2 n . The set GF(2) n may be identiÿed with the set of integers {i : 06i62 n − 1}: the element (i 0 ; i 1 ; : : : ; i n−1 ) of GF (2) n is identiÿed with i = i 0 + i 1 2 + · · · + i n−1 2 n−1 , where each i j is 0 or 1. We also say that (i 0 ; i 1 ; : : : ; i n−1 ) is the binary representation of i.
We deÿne
where y = (y 0 ; y 1 ; : : : ; y n−1 ) ∈ GF (2) n , and (i 0 ; i 1 ; : : : ; i n−1 ) is the binary representation of i. It is easy to check that, for all i with 06i62 n − 1, this gives all the 2 n characters from GF (2) n to GF(3) * with f 0 as the trivial character, so M = {f 0 ; f 1 ; : : : ; f 2 n −1 }. Since we identify i and y with their respective binary representation, we have f i (y) = f y (i).
For any subset X of GF (2) n , the group character code C X over GF(3) described by Ding et al. [5] is C X = (c 0 ; c 1 ; : : : ; c N −1 ) ∈ GF (3) N :
Let X = {x 0 ; x 1 ; : : : ; x t−1 } be a subset of GF (2) n and let X c be the complement of X in GF (2) n , indexed such that GF(2) n = {x 0 ; x 1 ; : : : ; x N −1 }.
Proposition 2 (Ding et al. [5, Proposition 2 and Section 3]
). Let X be as above. For 06i6N − 1; let v i denote the vector
Then the set {v 0 ; v 1 ; : : : ; v N −1 } is linearly independent. In particular;
has rank t and is a parity check matrix of C X ;
has rank N − t and is a generator matrix for C X ; so C X is an [N; N − t] linear code over GF(3). Moreover; H is a generator matrix for C X c and C X ⊕ C X c = GF (3) N .
Deÿnition. The Hamming weight of a vector a of GF (2) n , denoted wt(a), is deÿned to be the number of its nonzero coordinates. For −16r6n, let X (r; n) = {a ∈ GF (2) n : Table 1 The weight distribution in C 3 (1; n)
wt(a)¿r}, and let C 3 (r; n) denote the code C X (r;n) over GF (3) . For a word c = (c 0 ; : : : ;
, let the support of c be deÿned as Supp(c) = {i : 06i ¡ 2 n ; and c i = 0}:
By convention we deÿne the minimum distance of the zero code to be ∞.
Proposition 3 (Ding et al. [5] ). The following properties of the codes C 3 (r; n) are known:
The minimum nonzero weight codewords generate C 3 (r; n). (C) The dual code C 3 (r; n)
⊥ is equivalent to C 3 (n − r − 1; n).
In the sequel we deÿne v 0 = (1; 1; : : : ; 1) ∈ GF(3) n and
for all 16i6n, where e i is the vector of GF (2) n whose ith coordinate is 1 and other coordinates are all zero.
Proposition 4 (Ding et al. [5] ). The weight distribution in the code C 3 (1; n) is given in Table 1 ; where all the a and a i are nonzero elements of GF(3). 
where all a j ∈ GF(3) * ; r = m mod 3 is the unique remainder with 06r62; and 06i 0
The n weights w(m) in (2) are pairwise distinct and satisfy
Proof. We ÿrst prove that all the Table 1 this codeword has weight
If v 0 is not involved, according to the ÿrst row of Table 1 this codeword has weight
which is the same. This proves the conclusion for Case 1. Case 2: m ≡ 1 (mod 3). The proof is similar to that of Case 1, except that rows 2 and 3 of Table 1 are used instead.
Case 3: m ≡ 2 (mod 3). The proof is similar to that of Case 1, except that rows 4 and 5 of Table 1 are used instead.
It is straightforward to get
We now prove that
Assume that n = 2j is even. Then
So (3) is true when n is even. We can similarly prove that it is also true when n is odd. The inequalities then follow.
Proposition 5 gives not only the weight distribution of C 3 (1; n), but also the information which codewords have the weights. It also shows an interesting pattern in the weight distribution.
4. Our secret-sharing scheme 4.1. Splitting a big secret into a string of small ones In our secret-sharing scheme, the secret to be shared could be a positive integer or an element of GF(3 m ). Any positive integer s has the 3-adic expansion
where each s i ∈ {0; 1; 2} for all 06i6j and s j = 0. In this case, sharing the secret s becomes sharing each s i one by one. If the secret s is an element of GF(3 m ) for some positive integer m, it can be represented as
where {1; ; 2 ; : : : ; m−1 } is a basis of GF(3 m ) over GF (3), and s i is again an element of GF(3). In this case, sharing s becomes sharing each s i one by one.
Sharing small secrets
As we split a big secret into a string of smaller ones, we assume that the secret s is an element of GF(3) = {0; 1; 2}. This secret is shared among 2 n − 1 parties. We use the code C 3 (1; n) ⊥ to establish our secret-sharing scheme, and we use the approach described in Section 2. By Proposition 3 C 3 (1; n) and C 3 (1; n) ⊥ are [2 n ; n + 1; 2 n−1 ] and [2 n ; 2 n − n − 1; 4] ternary codes, respectively. Let G be a generator matrix of C 3 (1; n) ⊥ . Let s ∈ GF(3) denote the secret, and g 0 = (g 00 ; g 10 ; : : : ; g 2 n −n−2;0 )
T be the ÿrst column of the generator matrix G. Then the information vector u = (u 0 ; : : : ; u 2 n −n−2 ) is chosen to be any vector of GF(3)
u i g i0 . The codeword corresponding to this information vector u is t = (t 0 ; t 1 ; : : : ; t 2 n −1 ) = uG:
We give t i to party p i as his share, and the ÿrst component t 0 = s of the codeword t is the secret. This explains how to compute the shares. Recovering the secret s can be done by solving linear equations, as described in Section 2.
The following property of the code C 3 (1; n) is useful in understanding the access structure of our secret-sharing schemes.
Proposition 6 (Ding et al. [5] ). The supports of all the minimum weight codewords of C 3 (1; n) form a 1 − (2 n ; 2 n−1 ; n(n + 1)=2) design. The 2n(n + 1) minimum weight codewords are av i + bv j ; 06i ¡ j6n; a; b ∈ GF(3) * :
In some applications, a party may modify his share of the secret in order to cheat. We call such a party a cheater. In some cases, it would be good if a secret sharing scheme could detect and correct some false shares. The number of parties involved in this scheme is 2 n − 1. The access structure has the following properties: (A) Any group of less than 2 n−1 − 1 parties cannot recover the secret. Thus; more than half of the parties are needed to recover the secret. Proof. Note that the subscripts of our codewords range from 0 to 2 n − 1. The access structure of this secret-sharing scheme follows from Lemma 1. By Proposition 3, the minimum weight of C 3 (1; n) is 2 n−1 . The conclusion of Part (A) then follows from Lemma 1.
We now prove Part (B). By Proposition 5, there are participants that can recover the secret. The conclusion of Part (C) is true for all such secret-sharing schemes based on linear codes [10] .
Note that the code C 3 (1; n) ⊥ has minimum weight 4. Deleting the ÿrst coordinate of this code gives a code with minimum weight 3 or 4. Hence, it can detect and correct one error. Thus, the conclusion of (D) follows.
An example of the secret-sharing schemes
In this section, we describe an example of our secret-sharing scheme described in Section 4, speciÿcally, the case n = 3. This is a secret-sharing scheme involving seven parties.
The code C 3 (1; 3) is a [8; 4; 4] ternary code with generator matrix 
Its dual code C 3 (1; 3) ⊥ is a [8; 4; 4] ternary code with generator matrix
Let s ∈ GF(3) be the secret. Choose any vector (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ; u 4 ) ∈ GF(3) 4 such that u 1 + u 2 + u 3 + u 4 = s. There are 27 such vectors. The shares t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t 7 for the parties p 1 ; p 2 ; : : : ; p 7 are computed as follows:
(t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : ; t 7 ) = (u 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 ; u 4 )
If {t j1 ; t j2 ; : : : ; t jm } can be used to recover the secret s, then solve the following equation:
The secret s is then given by
x e t je :
All the codewords of C 3 (1; 3) tell us that a group of parties {p j1 ; p j2 ; : : : ; p je } can recover the secret if and only if the set {j 1 ; j 2 ; : : : ; j e } contains one of the following sets:
{3; 4; 7}; {2; 5; 7}; {2; 3; 6}; {1; 6; 7}; {1; 3; 5}; {1; 2; 4}; {1; 2; 3; 7}; {4; 5; 6; 7}; {3; 4; 5; 6}; {2; 4; 5; 6}; {1; 4; 5; 6}: (4) Note that each of the parties p 1 , p 2 , p 3 and p 7 appears 5 times in the above 11 subsets and each of the rest appears 6 times. Thus, each party has more or less the same importance in this secret-sharing scheme.
By Proposition 6, the supports of all the minimum-weight codewords form a 1-design. But the example above shows that the n(n + 1)=2 groups of 2 n−1 − 1 parties, obtained from the minimum codewords of C 3 (1; n), do not form a 1-design in general.
The minimum access structure
Let be the access structure of a secret-sharing scheme. An element B of is called a minimum access group if no element of is a proper subset of B. The set of all minimum access groups is called the minimum access structure, denoted , of this secret-sharing scheme. In other words, is a subset of such that (1) a group of parties can determine the secret if and only if it contains an element of as a subset; (2) no element of contains another element of . For example, (4) gives the minimum access structure of the secret-sharing scheme described in Section 5.
The minimum access structure of a secret-sharing scheme is interesting in the following senses: (1) It gives all the information about the access structure of the secret-sharing scheme, and the information it contains has no redundancy. (2) It shows the role of each party in the secret sharing. The determination of the minimum access structure is in general a hard problem. For our secret-sharing scheme based on the ternary code C 3 (1; n) ⊥ , the determination of the minimum access structure is related to the weight distribution of the second-order code C 3 (2; n).
We now prove a property of minimum access groups.
Theorem 8. Any minimum access group of our secret-sharing scheme based on C 3 (1; n) ⊥ must contain w(m) − 1 parties for some m with 16m6n; where w(m) is deÿned as in Proposition 5.
Proof. By Theorem 7 and the deÿnition of minimum access groups, for any minimum access group B we have B ∈ , where = {Supp(c) ∩ {1; : : : ; 2 n − 1} | c = (c 0 ; : : : ; c 2 n −1 ) ∈ C 3 (1; n); c 0 = 0}:
The conclusion then follows from Proposition 5.
We say that a codeword a covers another codeword b if Supp(a) contains Supp(b). By Theorem 8, to ÿnd the minimum access structure of our secret sharing scheme, we need only to look at the supports of the codewords of C 3 (1; n). Hence, for our secret-sharing scheme based on C 3 (1; n) ⊥ , the determination of the minimum access structure becomes the problem of ÿnding the set W of codewords in C 3 (1; n) such that (1) every codeword in C 3 (1; n) covers a codeword in W ; (2) if one codeword in W covers another one in W , they must have the same support. The following lemma is easily proved. where 06i 1 ¡ · · · ¡i ta 6n, 06j 1 ¡ · · · ¡j t b 6n, and the v i are deÿned as before. Hence
By the deÿnition of C 3 (2; n), a ⊗ b is a codeword of C 3 (2; n). Therefore, as long as we can determine the weights of the codewords of C 3 (2; n), we are able to determine the set W and hence the minimum access structure of our secret-sharing scheme.
Open Problem. Determine the weight distribution of the code C 3 (2; n).
As mentioned above, the determination of the minimum access structure of our secret sharing-scheme is not easy. However, we are able to determine some members of the minimum access structure, as shown below.
We ÿrst determine the distinct supports of the codewords Proof. First we note that, if x is a multiple of y, then clearly x covers y. Conversely, assuming x covers y, we prove that x is a multiple of y in several steps.
Step 1: If x covers y, then {i 0 ; i 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 } = {j 0 ; j 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 }. By Proposition 5, we have
and that x and y have the same weight. Suppose that x covers y. Then wt(x)¿wt(x+y) and wt(x)¿wt(x − y). It follows that |{i 0 ; i 1 ; i 2 ; i 3 } ∩ {j 0 ; j 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 }|¿2. Without loss of generality, we assume that i 2 = j 2 and i 3 = j 3 . Note that one of x ± y has at least the term v i2 or v i3 . By (5) we have |{i 0 ; i 1 } ∩ {j 0 ; j 1 }|¿1. Without loss of generality, we assume that i 1 = j 1 . Whence, we have
If i 0 = j 0 , then one of the following two statements must be true: (i) one of x + y and x − y has exactly three terms among v i0 ; v j0 ; v i1 ; v i2 and v i3 (and the other has four terms); or (ii) one of x + y and x − y has exactly ÿve terms among v i0 ; v j0 ; v i1 ; v i2 and v i3 (and the other has two terms). By (5) the weight of either x + y or x − y is greater than that of x, which is a contradiction. This completes Step 1.
Step 2: Assume i k = j k for 06k63 and deÿne a = (a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ; a 3 ) and b = (b 0 ; b 1 ; b 2 ; b 3 ). Then wt(a ± b) equals one of the numbers 0, 2, and 4.
If wt(a + b) = 1 (resp. wt(a − b) = 1), then wt(a − b) = 3 (resp. wt(a + b) = 3). Since w(1)¿w(3)¿w(4), the conclusion then follows.
Step 3: In fact, wt(a ± b) cannot be 2. Suppose, on the contrary, that wt(a ± b) = 2. By Proposition 5, x and y have the same weight 2 n−1 + 2 n−3 . Since x covers y, they should have the same support. That x and y have the same support means that every (z 0 ; z 1 ; z 2 ; z 3 ) in the space (GF(3) * ) 4 is a solution of the equation a 0 z 0 + a 1 z 1 + a 2 z 2 + a 3 z 3 = 0 if and only if it is a solution of −a 0 z 0 − a 1 z 1 + a 2 z 2 + a 3 z 3 = 0. However, this is not true. Hence, x cannot cover y, which is a contradiction.
Combining Steps 1-3, we have proved the proposition. i0 + a 1 v i1 ) , where a l = 0. Then x cannot cover y. The proof of (i) is similar to that of Step 1 of Proposition 10, while that of (ii) is similar to that of Step 3 of Proposition 10, except that we now compare x and x ± y.
Combining Theorem 7, Propositions 10 and 11, we obtain the following conclusion. where 06j 0 ¡j 1 6n.
